Sandra F. Walker ("Walker") underwent dental treatment during January of 1990. Walker then instituted a malpractice action in Mississippi state court against the dentist, Dr. Van R. Simmons ("Simmons"), alleging that Simmons propped her mouth open excessively causing her to undergo three inpatient surgeries for repair of her right and left temporomandibular joints. The inpatient surgeries totaled $41,598.59 and were paid by the Wal-Mart Associates Group Health Plan ("Plan").

On June 19, 1996, Walker released Simmons of all claims in exchange for a settlement agreement of $12,500. Walker then instituted a declaratory judgment action in state court arguing that she was entitled to the entire $12,500. The case was removed to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the Plan's motion for Summary Judgment and ordered Walker to pay the entire $12,500 to the Plan for reimbursement of the medical expenses paid on her behalf. The operative language of the plan read as follows:

The Plan shall have the right to reduce benefits otherwise payable by the Plan or recover benefits previously paid by the Plan to the extent of any and all of the following:

A. Any payments resulting from a judgment or settlement, or other payment or payments, made or to be made by any person or persons considered responsible for the condition giving rise to the medical expense or by their insurers . . . .

Id. at 940, 22 EBC at 2153. The Fifth Circuit found this language to be unambiguous, and held that the Plan Administrator's interpretation of the language was not an abuse of discretion. The court stated:

We agree with the district court in holding that the "any and all" language plainly means the first dollar of recovery (any) and 100% recovery (all) of the funds received by the plaintiff in the settlement, up to [sic] full amount of the benefits paid. The Plan's language does not include a provision for reduction of its subrogation lien for payment of attorneys' fees or costs.

Id.  The court's holding prevented Walker's attorney from receiving attorney's fees from the settlement prior to the Plan's reimbursement. The Plan, because of the language used in its terms, was entitled to the entire $12,500 despite the claim by plaintiff's counsel for attorney's fees. The court further held, "in the absence of any expressly selected alternative standard, the Plan Priority norm vested the Plan with unconditional reimbursement for the full amount of the medical benefits paid to Walker." Id. at 941, 2153.